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COLLATERAL DAMAGES: HOW THE 
SMARTPHONE PATENT WARS ARE 
CHANGING THE LANDSCAPE OF PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES CALCULATIONS 
Martin West* 
ABSTRACT 
This Note addresses the diverging approaches to patent 
infringement damages calculations.  Judge Alsup of the Ninth Circuit 
recently took a rare approach and selected Dr. James Kearl to testify 
as an independent damages expert in Oracle v. Google under Rule 
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In contrast, Judge Posner of 
the Seventh Circuit recently dismissed the Apple v. Motorola lawsuit, 
finding that each party failed to present adequate evidence of their 
respective damages claims.  Judge Koh of the Ninth Circuit took yet 
another approach using a more relaxed level of admissibility for 
expert testimony relating to infringement damage calculations.  This 
Note analyzes all three approaches in the context of the suits at issue 
and proposes that Judge Alsup’s approach is the best, for numerous 
reasons. 
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“Then you do make a profit for yourself,” Yossarian declared. 
“Of course I do.  But it all goes to the syndicate.  And everybody has 
a share.  Don’t you understand?  It’s exactly what happens with 
those plum tomatoes I sell to Colonel Cathcart.” 
“Buy,” Yossarian corrected him.  “You don’t sell plum tomatoes to 
Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn.  You buy plum tomatoes from 
them.” 
“No, sell,” Milo corrected Yossarian.  “I distribute my plum 
tomatoes in markets all over Pianosa under an assumed name so 
that Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn can buy them up from me 
under their assumed names at four cents apiece and sell them back 
to me the next day for the syndicate at five cents a piece.  They 
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make a profit of one cent a piece, I make a profit of three and a half 
cents apiece, and everybody comes out ahead.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of the United States Patent system is to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”2  The hope is that granting creators of 
patentable inventions a monopoly on their “discoveries” will promote 
a paradigm in which people are encouraged to invent and develop 
without fear of having their ideas stolen.  Incentivizing innovation 
would thus result in the rapid development of technology in such a 
way that “everybody comes out ahead.”3 
The recent growth of litigation surrounding the smartphone patent 
wars has called into question the need for and the utility of patents.4  
While the patent system is no stranger to the public spotlight, recent 
developments have been so widely discussed that the head of the 
Patent and Trademark Office, David Kappos, came forward to make 
a public statement telling critics to “[g]ive it a rest already.”5  While 
this Note cannot possibly discuss all of the alleged problems 
surrounding software patents, it will attempt to discern an underlying 
problem stemming from infringement damage calculations in light of 
three recent cases: Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle v. 
Google),6 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. (Apple v. Motorola),7 and 
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple v. Samsung).8  These 
calculations can be as complicated as every other phase of patent 
litigation and thus deserve equal discussion. 
This Note therefore consists of three parts.  Part I provides the 
background principles underlying damage calculations in patent 
																																																																																																																																
 1. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 232 (1955). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl. 8. 
 3. HELLER, supra note 1, at 232. 
 4. For an infographic depicting the numerous parties and lawsuits involved in the 
smartphone patent wars, see Sascha Segan, Infographic: Smartphone Patent Wars 
Explained, PC MAGAZINE (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817, 
2399098,00.asp. 
 5. Timothy B. Lee, US Patent Chief to Software Patent Critics: “Give it a Rest 
Already”, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 20, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/ 
us-patent-chief-to-software-patent-critics-give-it-a-rest-already. 
 6. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 7. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560 (N.D. Ill. 
May 22, 2010). 
 8. Apple, Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2571719 
(N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012). 
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infringement cases.  Part II describes the way these principles have 
been applied in three recent patent disputes involving smartphone 
components.  Finally, Part III argues that the approach adopted by 
Judge Alsup in Oracle v. Google is, currently, the best approach 
available and should be more widely adopted. 
While such an approach is unprecedented, it provides the best 
answer to the problems underlying software patent infringement 
damage calculations in cases where a single product contains 
hundreds, if not thousands, of patented components.  This Note also 
contends that stricter evidentiary standards leave lawyers in a 
quagmire when trying to predict a lawsuit’s chance of success. 
I.  PATENT DAMAGE CALCULATIONS: A LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Damage Approaches 
Damage awards in patent infringement cases are governed by 35 
U.S.C. § 284, which requires courts to award damages “adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer” 
in cases where infringement is found.9  Under this standard, district 
courts are given broad discretion to assess and compute damages.10 
B. Two Roads Diverged: Analytical Approach and Hypothetical 
Negotiation Scenario 
A frequently used methodology of damage calculation under § 284 
is the reasonable royalty analysis.11  The reasonable royalty analysis 
has two approaches.  The first is the “analytical approach,” which 
requires “subtract[ing] the infringer’s usual or acceptable net profit 
from its anticipated net profit realized from sales of infringing 
devices.”12  Put more concretely, this approach involves subtracting 
overhead expenses from the infringer’s expected gross profit.13  The 
industry standard net profit is then subtracted from the difference of 
																																																																																																																																
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 10. TWM Mfg. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The 
methodology of assessing and computing damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 is within the 
sound discretion of the district court.”). 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 899. 
 13. See id. 
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the original equation.14  The result of that calculation is the 
reasonable royalty.15 
The second, and more common,16 approach to a reasonable royalty 
analysis is the willing-licensor-willing-licensee approach.17  The 
objective of this approach is to arrive at the royalty rate the patentee 
and the accused party would have agreed to if they had negotiated a 
royalty for the patent at the time the alleged infringement began.18  
While there are a multitude of factors that could be involved in 
hypothetical negotiations, courts “have consistently upheld experts’ 
use of a hypothetical negotiation and [the fifteen] Georgia-Pacific 
factors19 for estimating a reasonable royalty.” 
																																																																																																																																
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A 
reasonable royalty is the predominant measure of damages in patent infringement 
cases.”). 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. (“In litigation, a reasonable royalty is often determined on the basis of a 
hypothetical negotiation, occurring between the parties at the time that infringement 
began.”). 
 19. I4I Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 854 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  In Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the 
court stated, 
A comprehensive list of evidentiary facts relevant, in general, to the 
determination of the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent license 
may be drawn from a conspectus of the leading cases.  The following are 
some of the factors mutatis mutantdis seemingly more pertinent to the issue 
herein: 
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in 
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to 
the patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as 
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold. 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his 
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting 
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as 
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of 
business; or whether they are inventor or promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other 
products of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor 
as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such 
derivative or convoyed sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity. 
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C. Witness Standards 
1. Rule 702 
The complex nature of reasonable royalty calculations has caused 
many parties to enlist the help of expert witnesses to guide the fact-
finder to a proper damages award.20  The standard of review for the 
admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence21 and the case law interpreting that rule.  
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court 
held that expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant and reliable.22  
																																																																																																																																
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits 
to those who have used the invention. 
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in 
the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of 
the invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the 
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing 
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the 
infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as a patentee) and a licensee (such as 
the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) 
if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; 
that is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business 
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article 
embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a 
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount 
would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant 
a license. 
 20. Michael H. King & Steven M. Evans, Selecting an Appropriate Damages 
Expert in a Patent Case; An Examination of the Current Status of Daubert, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 357, 358 (2005). 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 702.  The rule provides: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 
the case. 
 22. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“To summarize: ‘General acceptance’ is not a 
necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the 
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The Court further elaborated that a trial court should consider (1) 
whether the theory or technique “can be (and has been) tested,” (2) 
“whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication,” (3) “the known or potential rate of error,” and (4) 
whether it is generally accepted in the scientific community.23  While 
other cases have further articulated the standard of admissibility, 
ultimately the district court judge is charged with a flexible 
“gatekeeping role” which allows “shaky but admissible evidence” to 
reach the jury.24  Evidence that is allegedly weak should not be 
excluded; instead the opposing party must attack the evidence with 
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof . . . .”25  Ultimately the 
jurors, as fact-finders, are tasked with deciding how much weight to 
give to the expert testimony.26 
2. Rule 706 
Additionally, courts may appoint their own witness or witnesses.  
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs court-appointed 
expert witnesses.27  It allows a court to appoint any expert that the 
litigating parties can agree to or one of its own choosing so long as the 
expert consents to accepting the role.28  According to Rule 706 the 
court-appointed expert must advise all parties of any findings he or 
she makes; be available to be deposed by any party; be called on to 
testify by the court or a party; and be cross-examined by any party.29  
While the power of the court to appoint experts of its own choosing is 
unquestioned,30 it remains largely unused.31 
3. Expert Calculations in Light of Uniloc and Lucent 
To calculate a reasonable royalty, experts would often employ the 
twenty-five percent rule.32   This “rule of thumb” generates a royalty 
																																																																																																																																
trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable 
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”). 
 23. Id. at 593–94. 
 24. Id. at 596–97. 
 25. Id. at 596. 
 26. Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 27. See FED R. EVID. 706. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 31. See generally John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His 
Own Expert Witnesses, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956). 
 32. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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rate by multiplying the alleged infringer’s profit rate by twenty-five 
percent. 33  The rule gained “widespread acceptance” for its ease of 
use34 and was “passively tolerated” by the courts until Uniloc USA, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,35 overruled it.36  The court called the rule 
“fundamentally flawed” because it “fails to tie a reasonable royalty 
base to the facts of the case at issue.”37 
Uniloc also prohibited the use of the entire market rule, which is 
another commonly used royalty calculation.38  Experts calculating 
infringement damages would use the entire market value of the 
infringing product as a baseline number, then multiply that figure by a 
very small percentage  (sometimes less than a hundredth of a percent) 
to arrive at a potential royalty rate.39  The Uniloc court clarified that 
the holding in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.40 does “not 
																																																																																																																																
 33. For a succinct and simplistic explanation of the twenty-five percent rule, see 
Peter Zura, CAFC Nixes 25% “Rule of Thumb” Application For Estimating Patent 
Damages, 271 PATENT BLOG (Jan. 5, 2011), http://271patent.blogspot.com/2011/01/ 
cafc-nixes-25-rule-of-thumb-application.html. 
In a nutshell, the application of the rule works like this: 
1. Estimate the infringer’s (licensee’s) expected profits for the 
product during the infringing period, 
2. divide the expected profits by the expected net sales over that 
period to arrive at a profit rate (e.g., 16%), 
3. multiply the profit rate (16%) by 25% to arrive at a running 
royalty rate (16% X 25% = 4%), and 
4. apply the royalty rate to the infringer’s net sales to get the royalty 
payment. 
The rule is based on the assumption that the infringer/licensee should retain 
a majority (i.e., 75%) of the profits, because it has undertaken substantial 
development, operational and commercialization risks. 
Id. 
 34. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1314 (citing over a dozen court opinions approving of the 
twenty-five percent rule). 
 35. Uniloc brought suit against Microsoft, alleging Microsoft infringed its patent 
covering a software registration system that prevents copying software to other 
computers. Id. at 1295–99.  Specifically, Uniloc alleged that the algorithm Microsoft 
used in its product activation software infringed Uniloc’s patent. Id.  Microsoft’s 
Product Activation served to protect a number of Window’s operating systems and 
Microsoft Office. Id.  This feature required users to enter a twenty-five-digit 
alphanumeric product key. Id.  The software then created a Product ID, which was 
used to establish a digital license for the user. See id. 
 36. See id. at 1315. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1319. 
 39. Id. at 1318. 
 40. Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Lucent 
brought suit against Gateway, and Microsoft subsequently intervened.  Lucent 
claimed Microsoft also infringed its patents.  The jury found Microsoft liable for most 
of the patent infringement claims. Id. at 1308–09.  On appeal, Microsoft argued that 
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allow consideration of the entire market value of accused products for 
minor patent improvements simply by asserting a low enough royalty 
rate.”41 
These rulings created a void in the options available to experts for 
proving infringement damages.  Courts are currently attempting to fill 
the unoccupied space where the twenty-five percent rule and the 
entire market value rule once stood, but are doing so in a piecemeal 
fashion by different courts using different approaches that are often 
incongruous.  These differing approaches have become the source of 
much uncertainty in the patent damages field—uncertainty that is 
detrimental to an institution that values “‘rules that are established, 
known, accepted, and respected’ . . . . [and] a predictable legal 
system.”42 
II.  THREE CASE STUDIES 
Some individuals have suggested that the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (Act)43 provides sufficient reform for the patent system; 
however, no part of the Act discusses infringement damages.  It is 
thus unlikely that the Act would solve any of the problems presented 
by the three cases examined in this Note: Oracle v. Google,44 Apple v. 
Motorola,45 and Apple v. Samsung.46  These cases illustrate the 
different effects that courts’ respective interpretations of damages 
expert standards can have on a trial.  Each case involved patent 
disputes related to smartphone components.  The parties to these 
																																																																																																																																
the entire market value rule was improperly applied. Id.  The Federal Circuit agreed, 
finding “Lucent did not satisfy its burden of proving the applicability of the entire 
market value rule.” Id. at 1338.  However, “when the patented invention is a small 
component of a much larger commercial product, awarding a reasonable royalty 
based on either sale price or number of units sold can be economically justified,” and 
“[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire 
product, especially when there is no established market value for the infringing 
component or feature, so long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the 
base represented by the infringing component or feature.” Id. at 1339. 
 41. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1320. 
 42. Sidney B. Brooks, Building Blocks for a Rule of Law, 36 COLO. LAW. 19, 19 
(2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Toni M. Fine, Professor, Fordham Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Speech in Lagos, Nigeria: Rule of Law and Sustainable Democracy (Oct. 
2005)). 
 43. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 44. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 45. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560 (N.D. Ill. 
May 22, 2012). 
 46. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2571332 
(N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012). 
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cases each called upon numerous expert witnesses to testify to the 
extent of the damages caused by the alleged infringement.  Because 
they are factually and procedurally similar on their faces, these cases 
easily lend themselves to an in-depth comparison of the differing 
judicial approaches to damages calculations. 
The courts in Oracle v. Google and Apple v. Samsung analyzed 
damages experts’ reports under the standards provided by Rule 702, 
Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., and Daubert.47  Apple v. 
Motorola employed a different standard, utilizing Daubert,48 Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,49 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.50 
Oracle v. Google is a remarkably unique case for several reasons.  
First, the Northern District of California allowed Oracle’s damages 
expert, Iain Cockburn, to file three separate damages reports, each 
after large portions of the prior report were excluded.51  Even the 
court acknowledged the peculiarity of this approach.52  The court also 
appointed a Federal Rules of Evidence 706 (“Rule 706”) expert, 
James Kearl.53  Rule 706 allows the court to appoint a neutral expert 
witness who can be called to testify on the stand and cross-examined 
by any party.54  In what may have been the most “unprecedented” 
decision of the case, the court appointed an attorney, John Cooper to 
represent Kearl and examine him at trial.55 
																																																																																																																																
 47. See Oracle, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (“An expert witness may provide opinion 
testimony if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony 
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case . . . .  District courts thus are 
charged with a gatekeeping role, the objective of which is to ensure that expert 
testimony admitted into evidence is both reliable and relevant.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Samsung, 2012 WL 2571332, at *1. 
 48. Apple v. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *1 (“‘Vigorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are 
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’” 
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 596 (1993))). 
 49. Id. at *2 (“An important test . . . is whether the expert ‘employs in the 
courtroom the same levels of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an 
expert in the relevant field.’” (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
152 (1999))). 
 50. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702). 
 51. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 20, 2012) (ECF No. 702). 
 52. Id. slip op. at 4 (“[A] third try of this magnitude is rare in federal litigation.”). 
 53. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 30, 2011) (ECF No. 374). 
 54. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 55. Ginny LaRoe, Oracle/Google Trial Places Farella Partner in Odd Spot, 
RECORDER, April 16, 2012 available at http://www.fbm.com/files/News/0dc4fae4-
4cab-45aa-afa2-f9ab3c2d178d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fe4cdb13-8bcf-40e2-
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To determine how unpredictable software patent damages have 
become it is necessary to examine incommensurability and peculiarity 
within and between the cases.  As discussed more fully below, five 
issues arising in the three cases lend themselves to this sort of 
analysis: defining the alleged infringement; information generated 
after the date of the hypothetical reasonable royalty negotation; 
reliance on potentially biased sources; use of survey data; and 
calculations based on similar products and software.56  Although each 
issue is not present in every case, in sum, they help illuminate the 
general approach of each court. 
Part II.A provides a brief procedural history of each case.  Part II.B 
discusses the five issues enumerated above. Specifically, Part II.B.1 
analyzes how the the court in Oracle v. Google addressed the issue of 
defining the alleged infringment.  Part II.B.2 is also specific to Oracle 
v. Google and discusses how courts approach experts’ reliance on 
information generated after the date of the hypothetical reasonable 
royalty negotation.  Part II.B.3 discusses how all three courts 
approached experts’ reliance on potentially biased sources.   Part 
II.B.4 addresses expert reliance on surveys, which is also addressed in 
all three cases.  Finally, Part II.B.5 examines damage calculations 
based on similar products and software.  Again, this topic is common 
to all three cases. 
A. Procedural History 
This section will provide a brief background of the procedural 
history of each case. 
1. Oracle v. Google 
Oracle brought suit against Google in the Northern District of 
California, where the case was assigned to Judge Alsup.57  Oracle 
alleged that Google infringed thirty-seven Java packages (a copyright 
claim) and several of Oracle’s patents.58  The trial was divided into 
																																																																																																																																
a9d5-ec3e5d96e7b2/4-16-
12%20The%20Recorder%20Oracle_Google%20Cooper%20 
Reprint.pdf (“[I]n all the instances anyone can cite, it’s been the judge, or lawyers for 
the parties, doing the questioning.”). 
 56. See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
 57. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 58. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, (N.D. Cal. May 31, 
2012) (ECF No. 1202), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-
1202.pdf. 
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three phases: copyright, patent, and damages.59  By the time the trial 
entered the patent phase, two patents remained at suit, U.S. Patent 
Nos. 6,061,52060 and RE38,104.61 
2. Apple v. Motorola 
Apple brought suit against Motorola in the Western District of 
Wisconsin, alleging Motorola infringed on several of its patents, while 
Motorola brought a counterclaim alleging Apple had infringed on 
numerous patents Motorola held.62  Ultimately the numerous claims 
were combined and transferred to the Northern District of Illinois 
where Judge Posner, sitting by designation, presided over the case.63  
After Judge Posner issued his initial ruling on the admissibility of 
expert testimony, six patents remained in the litigation.64  Apple’s 
four remaining patents included U.S. Patent Nos. 7,479,94965 (referred 
to in the case as ‘949),66 6,493,00267 (referred to in the case as ‘002),68  
6,343,26369 (referred to in the case as ‘263),70 5,946,64771 (referred to in 
																																																																																																																																
 59. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561, (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) 
(ECF No. 564). 
 60. This patent covers a method and system for performing static initialization.  
For more information on this patent, see U.S. Patent No. 6,061,520 (filed Apr. 7, 
1998) (issued May 9, 2000). 
 61. This patent covers a method and apparatus for resolving data references in 
generated code.  For more information see U.S. Patent No. RE38,104 (filed Mar. 3, 
1999) (issued Apr. 29, 2003). 
 62. See Jack Purcher, Patent Infringement Lawsuit: Motorola vs. Apple—Illinois 
Case 1, PATENTLY APPLE (Oct. 7, 2010, 8:10 AM), http://www.patentlyapple.com/ 
patently-apple/2010/10/patent-infringement-lawsuit-motorola-vs-apple-illinois-case-
1.html; Jack Purcher, Patent Infringement Lawsuit: Motorola vs. Apple—Illinois 
Case 2, PATENTLY APPLE (Oct. 7, 2010, 8:09 AM), http://www.patentlyapple.com/ 
patently-apple/2010/10/patent-infringement-lawsuit-motorola-vs-apple-illinois-case-
2.html. 
 63. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012). 
 64. Id. 
 65. This patent covers a touch screen device, method, and graphical user interface 
for determining commands by applying heuristics.  For more information, see U.S. 
Patent No. 7,479,949 (filed Apr. 11, 2008) (issued Jan. 20, 2009). 
 66. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *6. 
 67. This patent covers a method and apparatus for displaying and accessing 
control and status information in a computer system.  See U.S. Patent No. 6,493,002 
(filed Mar. 20, 1997) (issued Dec. 10, 2002). 
 68. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *2. 
 69. This patent covers a real-time signal processing system for serially transmitted 
data.  For more information see U.S. Patent No. 6,343,263 (filed Aug. 2, 1994) (issued 
Jan. 29, 2002). 
 70. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *9. 
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the case as ‘647).72  Motorola’s two remaining patents were U.S. 
Patent Nos. 6,175,55973 (referred to in the case as ‘559)74 and 
6,359,89875 (referred to in the case as ‘898).76 
3. Apple v. Samsung 
Apple brought suit against Samsung in the Northern District of 
California, where Judge Koh presided over the case.77  Apple alleged 
that Samsung violated three utility patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 
7,469,381,78 7,844,915,79 7,864,16380 and four design patents, U.S. 
Patent Nos. D504,889,81 D593,087,82 D618,677,83 and D604,305.84  
Samsung countersued, alleging Apple violated five of its utility 
patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,675,941,85 7,698,711,86 7,577,460,87 
7,456,893,88 and 7,447,516.89 
																																																																																																																																
 71. This patent covers a system and method for performing an action on a 
structure in computer-generated data.  For more information, see U.S. Patent No. 
5,946,647 (filed Feb. 1 ,1996) (issued Aug. 31, 1999). 
 72. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *10. 
 73. This patent covers a method for generating preamble sequences in a code 
division multiple access system.  For more information, see U.S. Patent No. 6,175,559 
(filed Jul. 7, 1999) (issued Jan. 16, 2001). 
 74. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *11. 
 75. This patent covers a method for performing a countdown function during a 
mobile-originated transfer for a packet radio system.  For more information, see U.S. 
Patent No. 6,359,898 (filed Aug. 28, 1998) (issued Mar. 19, 2002). 
 76. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *11. 
 77. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2571719 
(W.D. Cal. June 30, 2012). 
 78. This patent covers list scrolling and document translation, scaling, and 
rotation on a touch-screen display. For more information, see U.S. Patent No. 
7,469,381 (filed Dec. 14, 2007) (issued Dec. 23, 2008). 
 79. This patent covers application programming interfaces for scrolling 
operations.  For more information see U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007) 
(issued Nov. 30, 2010). 
 80. This patent covers portable electronic device, method, and graphical user 
interface for displaying structured electronic documents.  For more information, see 
U.S. Patent No. 7,864,163 (filed Sept. 4, 2007) (issued Jan. 4, 2011). 
 81. For more information on this design, see U.S. Patent No. D504,889 (filed Mar. 
17, 2004) (issued May 10, 2005). 
 82. For more information on this design, see U.S. Patent No. D593,087 (filed July 
30, 2007) (issued May 26, 2009). 
 83. For more information on this design, see U.S. Patent No. D618,677 (filed Nov. 
18, 2008) (issued June 29, 2010). 
 84. For more information on this design, see U.S. Patent No. D604,305 filed (June 
23, 2007) (issued Nov. 17, 2009). 
 85. This patent covers the method and apparatus for transmitting/receiving packet 
data using pre-defined length indicator in a mobile communication system.  For more 
information, see U.S. Patent No. 7,675,941 (filed May 4, 2006) (issued Mar. 9, 2010). 
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B. Who Can Rely on What? 
This section discusses the five main topics the courts in these cases 
addressed in terms of expert damages testimony.  As mentioned 
above, these issues are: defining the alleged infringement; information 
generated after the date of the hypothetical reasonable royalty 
negotation; reliance on potentially biased sources; use of survey data; 
and calculations based on similar products and software. 
1. Defining the Alleged Infringement 
The question presented here is whether an expert should apportion 
damages in his or her damages report on a claim-by-claim or a patent-
by-patent basis.  This issue only arose in the case between Oracle and 
Google; thus, this Note will address the issue in the context of that 
case specifically.90  The court’s original ruling on the topic was in 
response to a challenge against Iain Cockburn’s (Oracle’s damages 
expert’s) testimony.91  It stated that a reasonable royalty “requires a 
claim-by-claim analysis.”92  In a subsequent ruling, the court affirmed 
this holding, asserting that “[i]t is a mystery why Oracle and Dr. 
Cockburn deliberately choose to disregard this aspect of the 
[previous] order.”93   In the court’s ruling on Cockburn’s third 
damages report, it reversed on this point and found that a claim-by-
claim basis was not required by current patent law and concluded that 
a patent-by-patent analysis was acceptable.94 
																																																																																																																																
 86. This patent covers the multi-tasking apparatus and method in portable 
terminal.  For more information, see U.S. Patent No. 7,698,711 filed (July 26, 2007) 
(issued Apr. 13, 2010). 
 87. This patent covers a portable composite communication terminal for 
transmitting/receiving and images, and operation method and communication system 
thereof.  For more information, see U.S. Patent No. 7,577,460 (filed July 26, 2006) 
(issued Aug. 18, 2009). 
 88. This patent covers the method of controlling digital image processing 
apparatus for efficient reproduction and digital image processing apparatus using the 
method.  For more information, see U.S. Patent No. 7,456,893 (filed June 27, 2005) 
(issued Nov. 25, 2008). 
 89. This patent covers a method and apparatus for data transmission in a mobile 
telecommunication system supporting enhanced uplink service.  For more 
information, see U.S. Patent No. 7,447,516 (June 9, 2005) (issued Nov. 4, 2008). 
 90. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 91. Id. at 1114. 
 92. Id. at 1116. 
 93. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 94. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 850705, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012). 
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This reversal is a prime example of the sort of problems that 
uncertainty and ambiguity generate in the field.  Even if the court 
properly corrected what was originally a mistake, Google, having 
prevailed on its original motion to exclude portions of Cockburn’s 
testimony, may have had its damages expert rely on the court’s initial 
ruling.  Oracle was thus given an unfair advantage because it 
prevailed on a point previously disallowed, and Google was not given 
an opportunity to amend its damages report to rely on the subsequent 
ruling. 
2. Information Generated After the Date of the Hypothetical 
Reasonable Royalty Negotiation 
The question here is whether an expert can base a royalty 
calculation on information that was created after the date of the 
hypothetical reasonable royalty negotiation (e.g., sales of the 
infringing device).  This topic is also specific to Oracle v. Google, as it 
was not raised in either of the other cases.95  The main question 
underlying this issue is whether events that occur after the 
hypothetical reasonable royalty negotiation can impact the 
reasonable royalty.  The answer is unclear.  The court excluded 
Cockburn’s statistical analysis based on data collected from eBay 
transactions from January 2010 to June 2011.96  Cockburn used these 
figures to estimate how important each feature was to consumers.97  
The court noted that the largest problem with this analysis was that 
the “universe of know-how included in Android during 2008-2011 was 
different from the universe of know-how included in the 2006 offer.”98  
In other words, any knowledge gained from transactions between 
2008 and 2011 could not have played a role in negotiations that took 
place in 2006. 
In a subsequent challenge to Google expert Dr. Leonard’s reliance 
on, and analysis of, a 2010 accounting document that Oracle prepared 
in connection with its acquisition of Sun, the court appeared to 
reverse its position.99  Leonard used the document as an alternative 
basis for a reasonable royalty allocation.100  The court noted that while 
the document was from 2010, four years after the hypothetical 
																																																																																																																																
 95. See Oracle, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 877125, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012). 
 100. Id. 
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negotiation in 2006, case law finds “[p]ost-infringement information 
can be helpful in assessing whether a royalty is reasonable”101 and is 
thus admissible. 
The two items, the eBay apportionment and the 2010 financial 
document, may be differentiable for a few reasons.  Most importantly, 
the eBay apportionment is based on sales of infringing devices, while 
the financial document is Oracle’s own calculation of how much the 
patents in suit were worth.  Despite these differences, both of these 
items appear to fall under the eighth Georgia Pacific factor, because 
they relate to the product’s “profitability,” “commercial success,” and 
“current popularity.”102  The excluded eBay apportionment also 
appears to be covered by factor eleven: “[t]he extent to which the 
infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative 
of the value of that use.”103  The incommensurability presented by 
these two seemingly conflicting decisions casts doubt on how the 
court will accept and interpret evidence based on information 
generated after the hypothetical negotiation. 
3. Reliance on Potentially Biased Sources 
Experts often rely on the testimony of other experts or sources of 
information from outside the litigation context to supplement their 
testimony.  The three courts here take different approaches when 
handling experts’ reliance on these sources when the source may 
potentially be biased.  Each approach will be discussed in turn. 
In Oracle v. Google, Oracle alleged that Google’s experts, Drs. 
Leonard and Cox, were “spoon-fed” information by Google 
employees and improperly relied on this information for their 
damages calculations. 104  The court denied Oracle’s motion to exclude 
on these grounds and noted that if Oracle was worried about 
Google’s employees’ bias, then Oracle’s attorneys should address that 
issue on cross-examination.105 
																																																																																																																																
 101. Id. (citing Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)). 
 102. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (describing factor eight as “[t]he established profitability of the 
product made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 WL 5914033, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). 
 105. Id. 
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Google also challenged one of Oracle’s expert’s calculations for 
bias.106  The expert, Dr. Cockburn, advanced a group-and-value 
approach to apportion damages.107  The core of this approach involves 
a qualitative ranking of each patent by Oracle engineers and 
distribution of value based on published studies regarding the skewed 
value of patent portfolios.108  Cockburn required a team of Oracle 
engineers to group patents in a proposed 2006 license deal between 
Google and Sun.109  The engineers then ranked these groups by 
importance.110  In a second analysis, Oracle’s engineers created a list 
of the patents Sun held prior to June 30, 2006.111  The engineers 
examined the list to determine which patents would have been 
included in a smartphone patent bundle.112  The engineers identified 
569 patents, which they grouped into twenty-two technology 
groups.113  The next step required the engineers to rank each patent 
individually.114  Cockburn combined the two surveys to determine 
which patents had the highest individual ranking and were also in the 
top three technology groups.115  Cockburn found three patents at suit 
met these criteria, and thus would have been valued higher than the 
other patents.116  Google objected to this form of apportionment, 
alleging that Oracle’s engineers were biased in ranking the patents.117  
Nevertheless, the court ruled that bias should be argued on cross-
examination, and not used as a basis for excluding testimony in a 
Daubert motion.118 
In Apple v. Motorola, Motorola’s expert, Mr. Michael Wagner, 
reported that $100,000 would be a reasonable royalty for patent ‘002, 
which covers a program that prevents the toolbar notification window 
from being partially obstructed by other applications or programs.119  
He based this figure on the cost of creating toolbar notification 
																																																																																																																																
 106. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 850705, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012). 
 107. Id. at *2. 
 108. Id. at *2, *4. 
 109. Id. at *2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at *3. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012). 
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window, which was only $67,000.120  He further reasoned that it cost 
less to alter the code slightly to allow applications to obstruct the 
toolbar, which would avoid infringement.121  He reported receiving 
these numbers from one of Motorola’s technical experts, Dr. Richard 
Cooper.122  Wagner further asserted that customers would not be less 
inclined to buy a Motorola phone if the toolbar notification window 
was occasionally partially obstructed, and thus Motorola should only 
be liable for the savings it derived from not inventing around Apple’s 
patent.123 
The court found this testimony to be inadmissible for several 
reasons.  First, Wagner’s testimony regarding the cost to develop the 
toolbar notification window was not expert testimony, but “fact 
testimony.”124  While expert witnesses may base their opinions on 
hearsay evidence, they are not allowed to use that ability to shield the 
source of the evidence from cross-examination.125  Second, Wagner’s 
conversation with Cooper “violates the principle that a testifying 
expert must use the same approach . . . that he would use outside the 
litigation context.”126  The court opined that outside counsel hired by 
Motorola to research non-infringing alternatives to Apple’s patent 
would not ask a Motorola employee for suggestions because 
Motorola would know how much it would cost to have their own 
employee complete the task.127  According to the court, Wagner 
should have canvassed independent software consultation firms.128 
The court excluded another part of a damages expert’s report 
because of a potentially biased source.  This calculation was related to 
patent ‘263, which encompasses a system that allows video and audio 
material to be streamed in real time without interruption or 
distortion.129  Brian Napper (Apple’s damages expert) estimated that 
it would cost between $29 and $31 million for Motorola to add a chip 
to its phone that would perform the same function without infringing 
on the patent.130  The court found fault with the origin of Napper’s 
																																																																																																																																
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at *9. 
 130. Id. 
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knowledge of the chip.131  He learned of the chip from an agent of 
Apple, not “a disinterested source.”132  Napper’s source was an 
independent contractor and Apple’s technical expert in the trial, 
Nathan Polish.133  The court criticized Napper’s approach for the same 
reasons it criticized Wagner’s calculation for patent ‘002: Napper did 
not act as an independent third party would act outside the litigation 
context, and thus his testimony was excluded.134 
The rulings discussed above show a clear difference between two 
schools of thinking.  The court in Oracle v. Google showed almost no 
hesitation in allowing testimony that relies on potentially biased 
information to reach the jury.135  On the other hand, the Apple v. 
Motorola court found similar testimony to be so unreliable that it 
excluded the testimony entirely.136  According to this court, had the 
damages experts been operating in a non-litigation context, they 
would have searched for non-interested parties’ estimates to 
determine possible non-infringing alternatives.137  This line of 
reasoning created a much higher bar for admissibility as compared to 
Oracle v. Google. 
The court in Oracle v. Google allowed Google’s damages experts 
to rely on statements from Google employees.138  The court clearly 
stated that bias should be exposed via cross-examination.139  When 
faced with another challenge to expert testimony that relied on a 
survey given to Oracle’s own engineers, the court in Oracle v. Google 
reiterated, “the issue of bias was a point for cross-examination at 
trial.”140  According to the standard in Oracle v. Google, the excluded 
reports from Apple v. Motorola would have been admissible and vice-
versa.  These standards are markedly different and there is 
uncertainty as to when, where, and why either one prevails.  As a 
slight aside, and a possible indication of what will happen on appeal, 
Judge Bryson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, sitting by designation in TQP Development, LLC v. Merrill 
																																																																																																																																
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at *9–10. 
 135. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 WL 5914033, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). 
 136. See Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *10. 
 137. Id. at *3. 
 138. Oracle, 2011 WL 5914033, at *1. 
 139. Id. at *2. 
 140. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 850705, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012). 
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Lynch & Co., found “the fact that a party relie[d] on a single 
employee is not dispositive” when the opposing party attempted to 
exclude expert testimony based on the standards delineated in Apple 
v. Motorola.141 
4. Surveys 
Shortly after the ruling in Uniloc, jurists predicted that experts 
would begin to rely more often on surveys.142  The expert reports in 
these three cases suggest the jurists were correct, but to what end?  
The courts were split on the standard for admissibility of royalty rate 
calculations based on surveys suggesting that such reliance is not 
necessarily correct.143 
In Oracle v. Google, Cockburn relied on a survey, created by Dr. 
Steven Shugan, in determining Android’s increased market share due 
to infringement.144  The court found these survey results were 
unreliable because only seven features were selected for the survey, 
and it left out several important features that could contribute to 
consumers’ preferences.145  Furthermore, Google argued the limited 
nature of the survey made it unable to determine real-world 
behavior.146  The court also agreed with Google on that point and 
granted Google’s motion to strike the market share determination 
derived from the survey data.147 
The experts in Apple v. Motorola faced problems similar to those 
Cockburn encountered.  Napper based his royalty estimate for patent 
‘002 on a consumer survey Motorola conducted.148  The survey asked 
																																																																																																																																
 141. TQP Dev., LLC v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 2:08-CV-471-WCB, 2012 WL 
3283354, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012). 
 142. See Stanley B. Block et al., Reasonable Royalty Damages: The “25% Rule” Is 
Dead!, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ 
reasonable-royalty-damages-25-percent-rule-dead (“Without the ability to rely on the 
25 percent rule, litigants and their respective experts will be relying more heavily on 
industry surveys and other analyses in applying the various Georgia-Pacific 
factors . . . .”); see also Robert J. Goldman, Partner, Ropes & Gray LLP, 
Presentation to Fordham IP Institute: U.S. Patent Damages After Uniloc: Problems 
of Proof, Persuasion and Procedure 11, (2012), http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Goldman_Uniloc.pdf. 
 143. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2571332, 
at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 
2012 WL 1959560, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012); Oracle, 2012 WL 850705, at *10. 
 144. Oracle, 2012 WL 850705, at *9. 
 145. Id. at *10. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at *11. 
 148. Motorola, 2012 WL 1959560, at *4. 
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customers to choose their top five reasons for buying a Motorola 
smartphone.149  Napper apportioned the value of the phone across the 
top five reasons customers selected for buying the phone.150  One of 
these reasons, “appealing features and functions,” included the 
notification window.151  Napper further opined that the only 
“appealing features and functions” were the ones customers used 
every day: four percent of the respondents reported viewing 
notifications every day.152  Based on the responses he received, he 
reached a reasonable royalty of $14 million.153 
The court noted several deficiencies with this approach.  First, the 
court reasoned that Napper’s assumption that only features used 
everyday contribute to a phone’s value was unreasonable.154  
Following Napper’s reasoning, if a person does not make a phone call 
every day, the calling function of a phone would add no value to it.  
The court analogized this to airbags in a car by noting “the fact that a 
car had airbags might be important to a consumer even though in all 
likelihood he would never use them.”155  Second, according to 
Napper’s methodology, the total value of the attributes selected by 
each respondent would equal 500% of the phone’s total value.156  
Third, Napper did not estimate the total value of the non-obstruction 
feature; instead, he estimated the value of the notification window.157 
In Apple v. Motorola, Judge Posner suggests several ways Napper 
could have revised his survey to make it reliable; however, those 
suggestions offer more confusion than guidance.158  Judge Posner’s 
suggestions speak to the substance of the survey while large portions 
of his criticism are directed at the methodology of Napper’s 
calculations based on the survey results.159  It appears that there are 
two shortcomings in Napper’s testimony with respect to his use of 
surveys: (1) the substance of the survey, and (2) second is the 
methodology of his calculations.  Without clearly delineating where 
																																																																																																																																
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at *5. 
 159. Id. at *6 (finding that Napper “threw [the damage] numbers together” in a 
“bizarre way” to come up with an “unsupportably high damages figure”). 
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the particular fatality (or fatalities) lies, the court’s suggestions do not 
provide substantial guidance. 
The court in Apple v. Samsung took a different approach, finding 
that “[t]echnical inadequacies in a survey, including the format of the 
questions or the manner in which it was taken, bear on the weight of 
the evidence, not its admissibility.”160  These varying standards make 
it extremely difficult for an attorney to predict the type of survey on 
which a damages expert can rely.  The Apple v. Samsung standard 
seems like a particularly low bar compared to the other two, but it is 
somewhat unclear.  Would inadequacies in the format of the 
questions cover surveys that fail to ask all of the necessary and proper 
questions or surveys that have intentionally vague response options 
that purposefully allow experts greater leeway in interpreting the 
results?  The court did not expand its ruling far enough to answer 
these questions. 
5. Royalties Based on Similar Products and Software 
In each of the three cases discussed in this Note, at least one expert 
based his reasonable royalty calculation on sales of a product that 
performed a function similar to the patented invention. 
In Oracle v. Google, Cockburn used an econometric analysis to 
estimate the amount of market share Android gained because of its 
alleged infringement.161  To determine this figure, Cockburn devised a 
formula based on eBay transactions. 162  First, he set a consumer’s 
maximum bid as his or her willingness to pay.163  He then collected 
data about each phone’s specific attributes that related to the patents 
at suit.164  Using these sets of data, Cockburn performed a regression 
analysis to determine how much a customer was willing to pay based 
on a smartphone’s features.165  Using the final figures from the 
analysis, Cockburn calculated how much less a customer was willing 
to pay for a phone that lacked features covered by the patents at 
suit.166  The court took issue with Cockburn’s assumption that sale 
prices of Android smartphones would remain constant even though 
																																																																																																																																
 160. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2571332, at 
*11 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 850705, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012). 
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he stated the phones would be less desirable because they lacked the 
patented feature.167  Put another way, Cockburn failed to account for 
the possibility that the price of an Android smartphone might drop to 
reflect decreased demand, which could result in Android maintaining 
the same market-share.  The court concluded that Cockburn’s failure 
to account for a possible reduction in sale price for Android 
smartphones made his econometric analysis unreliable and therefore 
excluded that portion of his testimony.168 
In Apple v. Motorola, Napper based a royalty estimate on the 
application “List Notifier Widget,” which performs some of the same 
functions as patent ‘002 regarding the notification toolbar.169  Napper 
based this estimate on the cost of the application, which he reduced to 
account for other functions the application performs.170  The court 
found that Napper was only able to estimate the value of the 
notification toolbar, not the value of the non-obstruction feature from 
the survey and excluded his testimony because of this shortcoming.171 
Napper performed a similar calculation for patent ‘949, which 
governed phones shipping with the “tap for next item” heuristic.172  
The only smartphones that fell into this category were those that 
shipped with the free Kindle application preloaded.173  He based this 
royalty calculation on a valuation of an Apple device, the Magic 
Trackpad.174  The Magic Trackpad offers users a laptop-like touchpad 
for their desktops.175  Napper assumed that a customer’s willingness to 
pay $69.99 for the Magic Trackpad instead of paying $49.99 for a 
mouse (specifically, Apple’s mouse) indicated the inherent value of 
gestural commands such as “tap for next item.”176  The court 
conceded that Napper’s assumption may be true, but noted that his 
analysis failed to ascertain what portion of that value is created by the 
“tap for next item” function as opposed to other gestural commands a 
user is able to perform with the Magic Trackpad.177 
																																																																																																																																
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at *6. 
 173. Id. at *7. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
338 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Napper’s calculation with regard to patent ‘647, covering structure-
detecting and linking, met a similar fate.178  Napper’s report stated it 
would cost Motorola $10.5 million to replicate the functions covered 
by the patent without infringement.179  Napper calculated this using a 
method similar to the one he used in patent ‘002, by basing his 
estimate off the cost of a program (purchasable through Apple’s App 
Store) that performs functions similar to those covered by the 
patent.180  This application, “Clipboard Manager,” was a compilation 
of five sub-applications, three of these sup-applications’ functions 
were related to patent ‘647.181  Napper apportioned three-fifths of the 
application’s one-dollar price to remove the price of the non-related 
functions from his calculation.182  The court noted a fatal flaw with this 
methodology: the consumers purchasing the application from the 
Apple App Store already had a structure for detecting and linking on 
their phones.183  In fact, they had a superior version to the one 
Clipboard Manager provided.184  This, the court said, meant that the 
structure-detecting and linking function of Clipboard Manager had no 
value to purchasers and would not provide an acceptable basis for a 
reasonable royalty calculation.185 
Apple’s expert in Apple v. Samsung, Terry Musika, offered a 
reasonable royalty calculation that relied on a license program (while 
not a physical product or software it is still analogous).186  The 
program, “Made for” or “Mfi,” gives certain hardware distributors 
the ability to put the “Made for” logo on products compatible with 
iPods, iPhones, and iPads.187  Samsung alleged, and Musika himself 
admitted, that the program was not a good comparison for the 
intellectual property in dispute.188  Nonetheless, Musika used the 
“Made for” program to calculate a floor for a reasonable royalty.189  
The court agreed with Samsung and excluded Musika’s testimony 
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relating to his reasonable royalty floor based on the “Made for” 
program.190 
The standards offered by the three courts do not seem to expressly 
conflict, but none of the rulings were issued on the same grounds.  
While not expressly disallowed, the probability of a royalty 
calculation based on the sales of analogous products surviving a 
challenge from the opposing party is slim.191  Cockburn’s calculations 
based on eBay sales, Napper’s calculations based on sales of the “List 
Notifier Widget” and “Clipboard Manager” applications, and the 
Magic Trackpad were all excluded.192  The overarching problem these 
estimates encounter is that they are generally unable to account for 
all of the variables that factor into a consumer’s decision to buy the 
actual product.  It is incredibly difficult, if not nearly impossible, to 
account for all of the reasons a customer would purchase a device that 
offers hundreds or even thousands of features.  It is even more 
difficult to accurately apportion the price of the item between each of 
the features. 
C. The Results Are In 
The jury in Oracle v. Google found that Google did not infringe on 
Oracle’s patents, and thus the trial never reached the damages phase 
on those issues.193  The claims and counterclaims in Apple v. Motorola 
were all dismissed because neither party had “evidence to withstand 
summary judgment on damages and injunctive relief.”194  
Furthermore, the case was dismissed with prejudice because “[i]t 
would be ridiculous to dismiss a suit for failure to prove damages and 
allow the plaintiff to refile the suit so that he could have a second 
chance to prove damages.”195 
Apple v. Samsung concluded with a jury verdict in favor of 
Apple.196  The jury found that Samsung had infringed on each patent 
at suit but the number of infringing devices varied per patent.197  It 
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awarded Apple $1,051,855,000 for the infringement; however, the jury 
was only required to determine the total damage caused by infringing 
the product.198  It did not have to report damages per patent within 
each infringing product.199 
III.  EVERYBODY COMES OUT AHEAD 
Three suits, five companies, two jury verdicts, one dismissal—any 
answers?  Based on these three cases the landscape of patent damages 
appears uncertain, especially regarding software patents.  This 
uncertainty creates problems for nearly everyone involved: patent-
holders, alleged patent-infringers, lawyers, clients, and judges.  As 
discussed above, uncertainty is detrimental to any rule-of-law 
institution and those charged with developing and enforcing the law 
should strive vigilantly to expel such uncertainty from the field.200 
A. Fallout 
Foreseeability may play the most important role in determining 
how a lawyer will craft a litigation strategy.  A problem arises when 
lawyers cannot predict how the courts will apply certain laws and 
therefore determine the expected outcomes of certain legal 
approaches.  Ambiguity in legal standards diminishes foreseeability 
and thus stands in stark contrast to the principles of a rule of law legal 
system.  To determine how much ambiguity has crept into the realm 
of patent damage calculation, it is necessary to examine what tools 
remain available for experts to use and whether those tools are 
sufficient.  
The cases discussed in this Note suggest that the fifteen Georgia-
Pacific factors still provide some guidance for attorneys and experts, 
but that guidance is insufficient to fill the gap left by Uniloc and 
Lucent.201  While the Federal Circuit has stated that courts “have 
consistently upheld experts’ use of a hypothetical negotiation and 
Georgia-Pacific factors for estimating a reasonable royalty,”202 this 
standard may also be in question.  The court in Apple v. Motorola 
questioned the utility of the Georgia-Pacific factors, asking, “could a 
judge or a jury really balance 15 or more factors and come up with 
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anything resembling an objective assessment?”203  Furthermore, in 
Oracle v. Google, the court dismissed the Oracle expert’s 
apportionment analysis based on eBay sales, which could arguably 
have been proper under Georgia-Pacific’s factor eight.  Despite these 
two examples, the courts did cite the Georgia-Pacific factors 
favorably;204 however, how and when courts will choose to depart 
from these factors is uncertain. 
In an interview with Bloomberg BNA shortly after the court’s 
ruling in Uniloc, Mark A. Lemley, a patent law professor from 
Stanford Law School, suggested the Georgia-Pacific factors 
boil down to three fundamental questions: (1) what is the marginal 
contribution of the patented invention over the prior art?; (2) how 
many other inputs were necessary to achieve that contribution, and 
what is their relative value?; and (3) is there some concrete evidence 
suggesting that the market has chosen a number different than the 
calculus that results from (1) and (2)?205 
In the same interview, Douglas R. Nemec of Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP agreed with Judge Posner’s position that the 
Georgia-Pacific factors were flawed.206  He said the factors “don’t do a 
lot to help draw lines on relevance,”207 and that litigators can “argue 
that virtually anything is at least ‘relevant’ to patent damages”208 
under one of the Georgia-Pacific factors. 
Roy J. Epstein and Alan Marcus, both professors at Boston 
College, proposed a new royalty approach, named the Financial 
Indicative Running Royalty Model, to step in where the law has been 
unable to update the Georgia-Pacific factors with a “simple, coherent 
method.”209  These differing approaches are not mentioned with the 
intent to take a position on the validity and utility of them, but rather 
are intended to show the criticisms and potential inadequacies of the 
Georgia-Pacific factors as they currently stand.  Further, they show 
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that jurists do not think that the Georgia-Pacific factors offer 
sufficient guidance to the attorneys and experts using them. 
David Kappos, the head of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, came forward to defend the patent system.  He 
told critics to “[g]ive it a rest already.  Give the [America Invents Act] 
a chance to work.  Give it a chance to even get started.”210  It is not 
clear if, and how, the America Invents Act will affect the smartphone 
patent wars and, more specifically, damages calculations.  Further, it 
is not clear that Kappos thinks the patent wars need to be ended or 
altered.  He said, “The explosion of litigation we are seeing is a 
reflection of how the patent system wires us for innovation . . . . It’s 
natural and reasonable that innovators would seek to protect their 
breakthroughs using the patent system.”211  It is reasonable to assume 
that critics of the patent system would point out the patents being 
litigated in the smartphone patent wars are not “breakthroughs,” but 
rather small, incremental changes. 
B. Congress 
Legislators could step in to make changes, but that option has 
received much criticism.  The general feeling is that legislation is not 
precise enough to properly solve the problems inherent in software 
patent damages and any legislation in the field would result in 
widespread collateral damage.212  The recently-retired former Chief 
Judge of the Federal Circuit, Paul Michel, has spoken on the topic.  
He advocated that “Congress should simply let the courts do their 
work and not intervene in an area where it cannot help.”213  Further, 
Chief Judge Michel stated, 
Damages law is unavoidably complex due to the myriad factual 
situations presented in the vast variety of cases . . . . Consequently, it 
does not lend itself to the simplistic, one-size-fits-all approach that 
legislation necessarily embodies.  That is precisely why damages law 
in nearly every other area has wisely been left to the courts.214 
If courts are allowed to craft the standards for damages 
calculations, as Chief Judge Michel suggests, it will necessarily be 
implemented in a piecemeal fashion.  A judicially evolving standard 
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in the patent field will inevitably result in unexpected results that will 
breed uncertainty. 
This brings us to the final question: if legislation is too blunt, but 
more precise judicial decisions are also problematic, which of the 
remaining solutions is best? 
This Note proposes that the best option is Judge Alsup’s approach 
used in Oracle v. Google. Simply put, use Rule 706 experts to prevent 
unexpected outcomes from having negative consequences. 
C. Judges 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee noted that 
increasingly complex economic, statistical, and technological data 
were becoming more prevalent in litigation.215  While some thought 
this would lead to an increase in the use of independent experts, it did 
not.216  Some commentators also expected Justice Blackmun’s 
comment in the Daubert opinion suggesting judges “should . . . be 
mindful” of their ability to utilized Rule 706 experts would result in 
more invocations of the Rule.217  This, again, was not the case.218  Rule 
706 experts are most frequently utilized to break deadlocked “battles 
of the experts,” and to help educate judges and juries with highly 
complex issues.219 
D. Fears Resolved 
This section addresses the four major concerns with Rule 706 
experts.  The first concern is that the use of Rule 706 experts may 
hinder attorneys’ ability to advocate for their clients.  The second is 
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whether jurors may perceive the Rule 706 expert as infallible.  The 
third worry is that the use of Rule 706 experts may be 
counterproductive insofar as it will drive each party’s experts to offer 
even more extreme damages calculation.  Finally, this section 
addresses fear of increased litigation costs. 
1. Advocacy 
One reason for the limited use of Rule 706 experts may be 
litigators’ bias against them.220  Some litigators believe the use of a 
Rule 706 expert diminishes the litigators’ roles as an advocates.221  
While this belief may be accurate, it fails to sufficiently account for 
two premises.  First, it does not consider the oft-stated remark that 
lawyers are risk-averse.  Zealous advocacy has very little utility if an 
advocate’s case is dismissed because her expert fails to prove 
damages, as was the case in Apple v. Motorola.222  A risk-averse 
individual should want a Rule 706 expert to supplement her damages 
report and provide a safety net in case the party’s expert testimony is 
dismissed for being inadequate.  This is especially true in a field such 
as software patent damages where the law is still evolving and thus 
uncertain.  Second, this line of thinking fails to account for is the 
litigator’s ability to cross-examine the Rule 706 expert.  If the litigator 
is worried about advocacy constraints, she can easily expose flaws or 
inadequacies in the Rule 706 expert’s testimony on cross-
examination.  On balance, a Rule 706 expert offers more to a litigator 
than it takes away. 
2. Infallibility 
Along a similar vein, jurists worry that Rule 706 experts “may 
acquire an aura of infallibility.”223  Judge Alsup implemented 
measures to eradicate this concern.  He took the “unprecedented” 
step of bringing in a lawyer to represent James Kearl, the Rule 706 
expert.224  The lawyer, John Cooper, was tasked with conducting a 
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two-hour direct examination of Kearl at trial.225  This approach is 
allegedly completely novel and does have quite a few benefits over 
the traditional approach.226  First, and most importantly, it extricated 
Judge Alsup from having to question Kearl himself, which is often 
done in cases with court appointed experts.227  The purpose of having 
a neutral attorney question the Rule 706 expert was to reduce the 
chance jurors would put extra weight on Kearl’s testimony, as jurors 
tend to do with court appointed experts.228  Cooper’s role also 
involved objecting to questions asked by Google and Oracle’s 
attorneys on cross-examination.  This unique format provides the 
Rule 706 expert with additional protection from improper lines of 
questioning and helps direct the jury toward the Rule 706 expert’s 
neutral damages figures.   Judge Alsup’s use of Kearl and Cooper in 
Oracle v. Google provided a framework for him to analyze the 
admissibility of damages experts’ testimony without running the risk 
of having the unforeseeable consequence of eliminating a party’s 
chance of recovery.  Unfortunately (though maybe not for Google), 
the bifurcated trial did not reach the damages phase, and the results 
of this unprecedented approach were never seen. 
It should also be noted that if jurors placed too much reliance Rule 
706 damages experts the results would not be outcome determinative 
as the Rule 706 damages experts would not be testifying towards the 
issue of infringement—ideally infringement would be determined in a 
separate phase of the trial. 
3. Counter-Productivity 
There is also concern that when a neutral expert is appointed, the 
parties will move towards the extremes in trying to admit their own 
experts because they will know that they will have a safety net if their 
experts are excluded.  To combat this, the court could require the 
parties’ experts to submit their reports first so they cannot alter their 
opinions after seeing the Rule 706 expert’s report.  The opposite 
could also be argued: that if one party gravitates too far to one 
extreme, i.e. further from the Rule 706 expert, the jury will dismiss 
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that party’s report as unreliable and decide on a figure closer to the 
Rule 706 expert and the opposing party’s estimate. 
4. Cost 
The cost of utilizing a Rule 706 expert is also a concern. 229  
However, if the parties are willing to accept the costs of paying for the 
expert, it makes no sense to dismiss a case or to accept an unjust jury 
verdict because the parties were inadequately represented regarding 
damages.  Furthermore, if parties are willing to spend millions of 
dollars on litigation costs, it would be foolish to assume they would 
run the risk of losing the suit rather than spend an additional amount 
that is relatively small compared to the cost of the entire case.  
Another possible criticism of this model is that the increased costs 
would make it more difficult for small, individual patent holders to 
enforce patents against possible infringements by large 
corporations.230  On the other hand, some judges have demonstrated 
an inclination to appoint Rule 706 experts when one party cannot 
afford to hire its own expert or when it cannot afford to pay the 
expert to adequately research and analyze the conflict.231  The 
purpose here is to overcome prejudice caused by one party’s resource 
limitations by leveling the litigation playing field.232  Courts also have 
discretion to divide the cost unequally “in the proportion . . . that the 
court directs.”233 
Another potential concern is that using an additional witness could 
unnecessarily extend the length of the trial.  This concern can be 
easily alleviated by imposing time restrictions on each party (as Judge 
Koh did in Apple v. Samsung) and subtracting the time required for 
the Rule 706 expert’s testimony accordingly from each sides’ allotted 
time. 
Judge Posner, who in Apple v. Motorola excluded each witnesses’ 
testimony and dismissed the case because the parties were unable to 
prove damages, noted that impediments to the software patent 
industry included the “limited technical competence of judges and 
jurors, the difficulty of assessing damages for infringement of a 
component rather than a complete product, and the instability of the 
software industry because of its technological dynamism, which 
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creates incentives both to patent and to infringe patents and thus 
increases legal costs.”234  Acknowledging the problem of assessing 
damages and the limited technological competence of laypersons 
suggests Rule 706 experts play an even more important role in 
software patent cases where the damage calculations can be 
incredibly complex.  The need for expert assistance to the courts and 
jurors is increasingly more important in cases where devices “may 
have tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, or separate 
components (bits of software or bits of hardware) that are arguably 
patentable.”235 
E. Benefits Realized 
Overall, Rule 706 experts offer numerous benefits to parties, 
litigators, judges, and juries.  Judge Posner has argued that when a 
Rule 706 expert is used, the court need not worry about the jury’s 
ability to understand the technicalities of the expert’s testimony 
because “his conclusion would be credible because of his neutrality 
and expertise.”236  He likens this to people willingly flying on airplanes 
despite not knowing how the plane stays in the air.237  Operating on 
this premise provides an even greater reason to appoint Rule 706 
experts in complex software patent lawsuits.  Judge Posner does note, 
however, that a court-appointed expert may be problematic in the 
damages phase because a jury could simply weigh the experts’ final 
numbers and factor in their credibility to reach a solution.238  While 
this may be reasonable for many cases, software patent litigation 
seems to stand apart.  As evidenced by the three cases analyzed here, 
it is incredibly difficult for experts and attorneys to determine what 
testimony is admissible.  It is even more difficult for a layperson 
operating with limited technical knowledge to determine how to 
properly analyze and weigh that testimony. 
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F. So Happy Together 
One remaining question is whether the Rule 706 experts should be 
used alone or alongside either parties’ experts.  Either option has 
merit.  Attorneys may be resistant to only using a Rule 706 expert 
because, as discussed above, it could decrease their ability to advocate 
for their clients.239  That concern could be remedied with rigorous 
cross-examination.  On the other hand, using only a Rule 706 expert 
would likely save the court time and resources.  Further, parties’ 
experts may cancel each other out in a classic “battle of the experts” 
scenario and the jury may discard their opinions in favor of the Rule 
706 expert anyway.  The most persuasive argument for using party 
experts in addition to a Rule 706 expert is that it would allow courts 
to make rulings on gray areas of patent damages, which could 
demarcate new boundaries to fill the void left by Uniloc.  Eventually, 
when a large enough body of law has developed, courts may be able 
to back away from such strong reliance on Rule 706 experts. 
While this approach is not without its criticisms, Rule 706 experts 
provide the courts with the best way to deal with the “unintelligibility 
of complex expert testimony . . . .”240  Further, they provide the jury 
“[a] deliverance . . . by some assisting judicial body . . . .”241  As Judge 
Learned Hand stated over 100 years ago, “[i]t is obvious that my path 
has led to a board of experts or a single expert, not called by either 
side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable 
to the case which lie within his province.”242  These words ring true 
again today, when judges and juries need more guidance than ever, 
especially if the lawsuit involves numerous complex technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
The split among these three courts’ approaches to damages 
demonstrates just one of the many criticisms leveled at the patent 
system in the United States.  It is, however, of paramount importance 
to remember that software patents are juvenile beings in the legal 
world.  It was merely twenty-five years ago that they received full 
legal protection and there is still debate over the wisdom of granting 
such protection.  While twenty-five years may seem like a long time, it 
is next to nothing when compared with the age of the ancient Roman 
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law the Supreme Court has been known to cite.  Furthermore, with 
respect to the smartphone wars, the smartphone designs being 
litigated have existed for less than six years.  The first case from these 
legal battles was filed less than five years ago as of the writing of this 
Note.243  It is far too soon to throw in the towel and say the patent 
system does not work with regard to software.  Instead, courts should 
prompt attorneys and experts to help cultivate this new field of 
blossoming legal argument and calculation.  This is certain to present 
difficult situations and require tedious legal analysis but unbiased 
experts can help courts carve out a new niche in the legal landscape.  
Following Judge Alsup’s example and Judge Hand’s proposal from 
over 100 years ago, courts should offer Rule 706 experts to help guide 
attorneys, judges, and juries through this burgeoning area of the law. 
																																																																																																																																
 243. Complaint, Nokia Corp. v. Apple Inc., 2009-CV-01002-UNA (D. Del. 
December 29, 2009), ECF No. 1. 
